discriminatory fallacies and prejudices: theoretical and pedagogical contributions

Abstract

In this paper, we present a pedagogical proposal that we believe will contribute to eliminating discriminatory prejudices in argumentative practice: namely, an explanation of the persuasive power of discriminatory fallacies based on the distinction between motives and reasons. We believe this proposal constitutes a conceptual tool that enriches the teaching of logic. On the one hand, it incorporates an ethical dimension into the study of fallacies. On the other hand, it serves as a theoretical resource for logic professors who are committed to contributing to the dismantling of discriminatory discourse. This pedagogical proposal is innovative in that it offers a way of critically reflecting on discriminatory prejudices from within the discipline itself when they are presented as grounds for supporting a particular position. We use the distinction between motives and reasons to explain the persuasiveness of discriminatory fallacies. In our opinion, this distinction enables us to identify the absence of logical relevance and, we hope, along with this, to weaken their persuasive power, given the risk of violent actions that their dissemination in mass media and their viral reproduction on social media can promote.